• We develop a 2-period model where manufacturer and the third-party sell durables.
M A N U S C R I P T Abstract
In this paper, we examine the impact of manufacturers upgrading strategy of durable products on the decision of third-party entrant in a secondary market.
To do so, we develop a two-period model in which a monopolistic manufacturer sells new durable products directly to end consumers in both periods, while a third-party entrant operates a reverse channel selling used products in the secondary market. The manufacturer releases an upgraded product (i.e., one that is technologically superior to the version introduced in the first period). We derive conditions under which it is optimal (1) for the manufacture to release an upgraded product in the second period and (2) for a third party entrant to enter a secondary market. We also find, through numerical analysis, that when upgrades are typically small or moderate, the upgrading of new products can increase a third party entrant's profitability in the secondary market but it does not benefit the third party entrant when upgrades are typically large.
Introduction
Upgrading is the process of replacing a product with a new higher quality version of the same product (e.g., one with a stronger function or higher performance, Fudenberg and Tirole (1998); Martin (2011) ; Anton and Biglaiser (2013) ). Frequent introduction of upgraded products has been recognized as 5 an important means by which firms continuously renew themselves in order to survive and prosper in a rapidly changing business environment (Koufteros and Marcoulides (2006); Anton and Biglaiser (2013) )and is particularly noticeable in durable goods industries. For example, a new mobile phone model is introduced into the market with innovative agenda, camera, or Internet functions 10 every month (Martin (2011) ), while in the automobile industry, car makers introduce new components with every new model yearly. Similar patterns can be observed in other industries, including PCs, household appliances (e.g., washing machines, dryers, and vacuum cleaners), CRT devices (e.g., TV sets and monitors), and consumer electronics (Anton and Biglaiser (2013) ). At the same 15 time, however, trading used products in secondary markets is also a common practice in many durable goods industries (Hendel and Lizzeri (1999); Shulman and Coughlan (2007) ; Yin et al. (2010) ; Schiraldi and Nava (2012) ; Shen and Willems (2014) ), including the used car and second-hand PCs, etc. As Computer Business Review (2005) 1 points out, these secondary markets have grown 20 rapidly in recent years with third-party companies, for example, the PC industry building$100+ million per year businesses in buying, selling, or leasing used computer equipment.
In this paper, we focus on the effect of product upgrading on third party used graded product gives consumers a higher utility, it will prompt those consumers who were planning to buy used products in the secondary markets to turn to the new products market for higher quality or performance. In this case, product upgrading will have a negative effect on the sales of used products, which will reduce the entrance propensity of a third party retailer. On the other hand,
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consumers earn a higher net benefit from replacing a used with an upgraded new product, so product upgrading will have a positive effect on the sales of used products, by ensuring greater availability of used products, which obviously increase the entrance propensity. These observations raise an important question that warrants theoretical analysis: whether the manufacturer upgrad-
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ing of new products actually affects the third party retailer's entrance decision to secondary market, and if so, how?
Yet the models used in previous research tend to ignore the effect of manufacturer's upgrading decisions on the secondary market and consider only these markets impacts on manufacturer's new product introduction strategies (e.g.,
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Fudenberg and Tirole (1998); Zhao and Jagpal (2006) ; Yin et al. (2010) ). Hence, in this paper, we focus on the effect of manufacturer's upgrading of new products on the sales of used products in the secondary market. To do so, we develop a dynamic two-period model in which a monopolistic manufacturer sells new durable products directly to end consumers in both periods, and a third-party 45 entrant sells used products (i.e., those marketed in the first period) in the second period through a secondary market that is not directly controlled by the manufacturer. Our primary interest is in answering the following questions: Under what conditions it is optimal for a durable goods manufacturer to upgrade new products in the second period? What condition is needed for the third-party 50 entrant to enter the secondary market in the second period? How does manufacturer upgrading degree affect the profits of channel partners? Hence our model differs from those previous studies in that it simultaneously considers an active secondary market, upgrading of new products, consumer market segmentation, and especially, the upgrade degree of new products as a function of consumer
Our analysis reveals that when the investment cost of upgrading products is low, manufacturers do have an incentive to release an upgraded version in the second period, but when the investment cost is higher, they do not. Moreover, although the degree of upgrade always has a negative effect on the price of 60 new products in the first period, its effect on the price of both used and new products in the second period is unimodal depending on intensity. We also find that the third-party entrant is likely to engage in the secondary market when the purchase cost of used products from former consumers is significantly low.
Most importantly, we show that the upgrading of new products can increase the 65 third-party entrants secondary market profitability when upgrades are typically minor or moderate but selling used products in the secondary market does not benefit the third-party entrant when upgrades are typically major.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and explains our contributions in more detail. Section 3 outlines the 70 key elements of our model, as well as the derivation of the consumer demand function. Section 4 describes the model framework, presents the optimal equilibrium solutions for channel partners, and reports our main findings. Section 5 summarizes our conclusions and suggests opportunities for future research.
Relevant Literature
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Our paper is closely related to the broader literature on durable goods and new product development strategies; particularly, those studies that address (1) the dynamics between new and used products and (2) the interaction between the secondary market and the introduction of upgrades in the durable goods industry. The first stream of research, which is especially well established, in-
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cludes Levinthal and Purohit (1989); Fudenberg and Tirole (1998); Shulman and Coughlan (2007) . Levinthal and Purohit (1989) examine the optimal sales strategy for a monopolist marketing a durable product in an existing secondary market. They show that not only limiting initial sales lowers new product can- Purohit (1998, 1999) ; Desai et al. (2004) ; Huang et al. 
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Our study is also related to the literature on the interaction between the secondary market and the introduction of upgrades in durable goods market.
Zhao and Jagpal (2006), for instance, examine the effect of secondary markets for durable goods on a firm's dynamic pricing and new product introduction strategies. They find that secondary markets have differentiating effects on pricing 105 across industries depending on the magnitudes of the innovation (major, moderate, or minor), and whether demand externalities are present. Martin (2011) then examines strategic behavior in a durable goods oligopoly where there is a positive probability of upgrade introduction. He argues that the presence of a secondary market not only increases the range of upgrades that are profitable 110 but also raises profitability for a given upgrade quantity because former customers can be charged a higher price for the upgrade. Both studies, however, assume that used products are sold in an isolated channel while in reality, retailers sell used goods for profit in a co-opetition environment, for example, in textbook markets used book sellers not only cooperate with the manufacturers 
Model Framework
In developing our framework, we consider a two-period model 2 in which a monopolistic manufacturer (M) sells new durable products directly to end con-160 sumers in both periods, while a third-party entrant (TPE) sells reverse channeled used products (i.e., cleaned and tested buybacks from former customers) in a secondary market not directly controlled by the manufacturer (see Figure   1 ). We assume that all products provide only two periods of service (see, Desai et al. (2004); Yin et al. (2010) ): "new" in period 1 and "used" in period 2. As 165 a result, only new products are available in period 1, but both new and used products are available in period 2, which means the manufacturer's new product sales face competition from the used products offered by the TPE 3 .
Following Desai et al. (2004) and Shulman and Coughlan (2007) , we assume that all players in the model are rational and follow a Stackelberg game (see
This assumption is consistent with previous literature (e.g., Desai and Purohit (1998) ; Desai et al. (2004) ; Xiong et al. (2012)), and a two-period model not only allows us to study dynamic issues while retaining tractability but simplifies the presentation of our analysis.
3 In reporting our analytic results, for convenience, we use the pronouns "he" and "she" to refer to the manufacturer and third-party entrant, respectively.
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A N U S C R I P T (2010), we assume that original and upgraded versions of the new produce are not marketed simultaneously.
A N U S C R I P T products p u in stage 2, period 2.
Product
To model the difference between new and used products, we designate the durability of the products produced in period 1 by factor δ (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1), which represents how well a unit sold in period 1 holds up in period 2 (when it is 185 classified as used). If δ = 1, the product is perfectly durable and shows no deterioration over time, meaning that in period 2, used units are identical to new units. If δ = 0, the product is nondurable and deteriorates fully after one period of use. In this paper, we consider only 0 < δ < 1.
Manufacturer
190
The manufacturer's problem is to set upgrade degree and price p i so as to maximize his profits. Here, i = 1, 2 denotes period 1 or 2. If the manufacturer introduces an upgraded product in period 2, we denote it as α > 0; otherwise α = 0 (i.e., the manufacturer sells the original product in period 2). We further assume that if an upgraded version is introduced, it requires an investment cost
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for the manufacturer, the amount of which depends on the upgrade degree.
Without loss of generality, we normalize the manufacturer's marginal cost of production and selling to zero.
Third-Party Entrant
The TPE's problem is to choose the price of used products p u in a way that 200 maximizes her profits. Suppose that used products have a residual value for all customers, the TPE occurs a reverse cost c from buying back used products for
profitable resale. We also normalize the TPE's marginal cost of reselling to zero without loss of generality.
Consumer Strategies
205
We first assume that the size of the consumer population does not change over time and can be normalized to 1 and that no consumer can use more than one unit of the product in any period. We can then derive the inverse demand functions from the consumer utility functions. We do so by modeling heterogeneous consumers using parameter θ to represent a consumers valuation 210 of the services provided by a durable, which is distributed uniformly in the
Consumer with type θ thus has a valuation of θ for a new product.
Recall that the durability of the product is δ, which represents how well a unit sold in period 1 holds up as a used product in period 2, then consumer with type θ has a valuation of δθ for one used product. We assume that no consumers sell 215 their used products directly to each other.
In period 1, the consumer can either buy a new product or choose not to. In period 2, consumers who bought a new product in period 1 can either replace it with a new version from the manufacturer or continue using the same product and abstain from the market at the end of period 2. On the other hand, con- do not buy in either period (OO). Like Oraiopoulos et al. (2012) , we assume that α < δ (i.e., 1 +α <1 + δ); otherwise, the one-period utility from the
improved product would be larger than the combined first-and second-period utility derived by the consumer from a first-period purchase (in which case, the ON segment would grow rapidly at the expense of all other segments).
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Using the above analysis, we derive the total utility for every consumer segment: (1) (NN):
and (5) (OO):
U OO = 0. In terms of consumer utility, if all five strategies are in equilibrium, then each consumer segment values the product more (i.e., has a higher θ) 240 than the next segment, so that NN valuation>NU valuation > ON valuation > OU valuation > OO valuation (Desai et al. (2004) . Solving for marginal
1+α−δ of the consumer who is indifferent between an NN or NU strategy. we can similarly obtain point
δ−α for the consumer who has the same utility whether adopting an 245 NU or ON strategy, point θ 3 = p2−pu 1+α−δ for the consumer who has the same utility whether adopting an ON or OU strategy, and pint θ 4 = pu δ for the consumer who has the same utility whether adopting an OU or OO strategy. for the manufacturer increase in upgrade degree α, while the quantities of used products (q OU ) for the TPE decrease in upgrade degree α.
(2) The second period quantities of new products (q N N +q ON ) for the manufac-255 turer decrease in product durability δ, while the quantities of used products (q OU ) for the TPE increase in product durability δ. It is clear that consumer utility increases with upgrade degree: the higher the upgrade degree of the new products in period 2, the greater the number 265 of consumers who purchase a new product in period 1, want to sell their used product and buy a new product in period 2, or who do not purchase a new product in period 1, favor to buy a new one in period 2. Thus, the secondperiod quantities of new products increase in the upgrade degree, but used product quantities decrease. This reduction occurs for two reasons: First, as 270 the upgrade degree increases, fewer consumers purchase a new product in period 1, preferring instead to buy an upgraded product in period 2. This choice shrinks used product sales in period 2. Second, from the manufacturer's point of view, higher first-period sales generate higher first-period profits, but also result in a greater quantity of used goods to compete with future new good sales, thereby 275 he prefers to limit the production of first period products. That is, fewer used products are available. Hence, overall, used products quantities decrease in the upgrade degree.
The decrease in second-period quantities of new products as product durability increases also has two explanations: First, as product durability increases, 280 more consumers who purchase a new product in period 1 prefer to continue using that product in period 2. This choice shrinks the market of consumers who purchase a new product in the first period and then sell their used product and buy a new product in period 2. Second, as product durability increases, fewer consumers who do not purchase a new product in period 1 choose to buy a new 285 product in period 2. Moreover, the higher the product durability, the higher the utilities and thus the number of consumers who purchase no new product in period 1 and buy a used product in period 2.
The higher the reverse cost of the used products (i.e., the higher the residual value of used products for consumers), the greater the number of consumers who 290 buy a new product in period 1 and then sell their used product and buy a new product in period 2. This observation implies that fewer consumers who buy a A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T new product in period 1 keep using it in period 2 because the higher residual value of the used products increases their utilities.
Finally, the higher the product durability, the higher the utilities of con-295 sumers who buy a product in period 1, meaning that more consumers who want to keep the product or sell it in the secondary market at its resale value in period 2 prefer to buy a new product in period 1. Hence, the first-period quantities of new products increase with the increase of product durability.
Model Development
300
As outlined previously, our model includes a monopolistic manufacturer who sells his new durable products directly to end consumers in both periods, while in period 2, a TPE sells reverse channeled used products in a secondary market not directly controlled by the manufacturer. We now characterize the equilibrium between the players involved with a focus on the following dimensions: Under 305 what conditions it is optimal for the durable goods manufacturer to release an upgraded version in the second period? What condition is needed for the TPE to enter the secondary market in the second period? How does the upgrading of new products affect the profits of the channel partners?
The TPE's problem 310
To ensure a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, we follow a backward induction method in which we first solve the third-party entrant's optimization problem under the assumption of rational consumer expectations. Denoting the TPE's profit by Π e , we formulate the TPE's problem 8 as
where the constraint q OU ≤ q N N ensures that the sales quantity of used products
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is not greater than the number of units that can be collected from consumers and p u and c represent the price of used products and their reverse cost to the TPE, respectively.
The manufacturer's problem
The manufacturer's problem is to maximize the total profit over the two 320 periods with respect to p 1 , p 2 , taking into account the TPE's best response and the consumers' two-period strategies. In order to obtain the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we follow the method of backwards induction. We first solve the manufacturer's second period problem and then solve the first-period problem. Let Π 1 and Π 2 denote the manufacturer's first-period and second-period 325 profits, respectively.
The manufacturer's second-period problem
The manufacturer's second-period optimization problem can be expressed
where p 2 denotes the price of the new products in period 2, and the TPE's best 330 response p * u is taken into account in the manufacturer's decision.
The manufacturers first-period problem
In period 1, the manufacturer decides whether to introduce an upgraded version of the new product in period 2. If he does so, the upgrade occurs an investment cost. Suppose that the investment cost function is
, where K represents the manufacturer's investment cost parameter, 
Manufacturer's decison
Threshold value of K
where
and, Π(p *
where the first part is the manufacturer's revenue in period 1, and the second is his revenue in period 2, and the third is his investment cost when he releases an upgraded version in the second period. The equilibrium decisions for the 340 players are given in Table 1 , in which the threshold value represents the cost below which the manufacturer will release an upgraded version, otherwise he will retain the old version (for a detailed technical analysis, see the Appendix A).
In the following, we will analyze the impact of parameters on the equilibrium 345 decisions. First, we look at how the price of used product p u change with respect to the product durability, the reverse cost of used products and the new product The role of product durability is two-fold. On the one hand, higher durability expands the market segment that chooses to continue using the product and shrinks the segment of consumers who decide to sell their used products and buy new ones in the second period. The result is a higher procurement cost
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for the TPE, which reduces product viability and thus product quantity. On the other hand, increased product durability increases the demand for used products in the second period (see Remark 1 (2)). The TPE can therefore charge consumers a higher price for used products in the secondary market.
As the reverse cost of used products increases (i.e., a higher residual value of 360 used products for consumers), more consumers prefer to continue using their original products in period 2, making it more difficult for the TPE to reverse channel used products. As a result, the TPE charges a higher price for the used products in the secondary market. The price of used products is unimodal in the new product upgrade degree because this degree has two effects on the 365 used product price: First (effect A), the higher the new product upgrade degree in the second period, the higher the utilities of consumers who do not buy in the first period but buy a new product in the second period. Hence, a higher upgrade degree makes the second-period new product more competitive at the expense of the used product, meaning that its price increases as the update 370 degree increases. Conversely (effect B), as the upgrade degree increases, the utilities that first period consumers obtain from selling their used products to the TPE and buying a new one in the second period increase, so the TPE can procure used products more cheaply, which has a positive effect on the quantity of used products. As a result, the impact of new product upgrade degree on 375 the used product price depends on the balance of the two effects. The used product price decreases with the new product upgrade degree when the effect
A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T
B is dominating, otherwise, the used product price increases with the upgrade
degree.
Next, we analyze the properties of the manufacturer's new product price,
380
which is presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The optimal prices of the manufacturer's new product have the following properties:
(1) the optimal prices of new products in both the first and second periods increase with the reverse cost of used products c;
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(2) the optimal price of new products in the first period decreases with the new product upgrade degree α;
(3) the optimal price of new products in the second period is unimodal in the new product upgrade degree α.
The property (1) is straightforward. Because the higher the reverse cost of 390 used products, the higher the residual value of used products (i.e., the higher the quality of new products in period 1), the optimal price of new products in the first period increases as the reverse cost of used products increases. The manufacturer can then charge consumers a higher price for new products in period 1. On the other hand, a higher price for new products in period 1 results
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in a lower sales volume for new products in period 1, leading to a lower reverse volume of used products for the TPE in period 2. This reduction implies that in period 2, the TPE faces strong competition from new products from which the manufacturer can benefit by charging consumers a higher price for new products.
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As the new product upgrade degree increases, both consumers who buy a new product in period 1 sell it at the end of period 1, and buy a new product in period 2 and consumers who do not buy in period 1 but buy a new product in period 2 enjoy an increase in utilities. Therefore, the second-period new products can become more competitive, meaning that the manufacturer always 405 has higher incentive to charge a lower price for new products in period 1 in order
A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T
to expand the new product market segment in period 2. This effect is driven by two opposing forces. On the one hand (effect C), a higher upgrade degree makes the second-period new products more competitive, so the manufacturer can charge a higher price for them in period 2; on the other (effect D), as the 410 upgrade degree increases, the TPE's procurement cost decreases, which has a positive effect on the quantity of used products. The latter, however, also leads to greater cannibalization of new products, which lowers the new product price in period 2. When the upgrade degree is low, effect C dominates effect D and a higher upgrade degree leads to an increase in second-period new product prices.
415
Now, we move to the TPE's decision, and we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. (1) If the manufacturer releases an upgraded version in the second period, there is a threshold value
such that when 0 < c < c, the TPE will choose to enter the secondary 420 market; otherwise, when c ≥ c, she will choose to withdraw. 
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This proposition shows that the TPE chooses to enter the secondary market when 0 < c < c because the optimal price of used products is greater than her investment cost (i.e., p * u > c), which makes it profitable to sell used products. If c ≥ c, however, the optimal price of used products is less than or equal to the TPE's investment cost (i.e., p * u ≤ c), so her engagement in the secondary 430 market is not profitable, which implies that the manufacturer can weaken his secondary market by improving the procurement cost of used products. For example, Cisco requires each buyer of its refurbished equipment to pay high relicensing fees for the proprietary software that runs on the equipment. This practice, in effect, creates a higher procurement cost for the TPE and eliminates
A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T Figure 3: Changing Trends in Reverse Costs
an IT server business, has deliberately attempted to eliminate the secondary market for its machines worldwide through its pricing and licensing schemes (Marion (2004) ).
Based on the proof given in the Appendix C, we can see that as the upgrade 440 degree increases, the threshold value of the TPE's reverse cost first increases and then decreases. We depict the intuition underlying proposition 3 (2) in Figure 3 (i.e., δ = 0.9), which displays the range of the TPEs reverse cost.
Here, a lower upgrade degree implies no significant difference between the upgraded and original versions, meaning that more consumers who buy a new 445 product in the first period prefer to continue using it in the second period.
This preference in turn leads to an increase in the TPE's reverse cost of used products. However, as the upgrade degree increases, more consumers who buy a new product in the first period prefer to sell their used product to the TPE at the end of period 1 and buy a new product in period 2, thereby reducing the
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TPE's procurement cost. Moreover, when the upgrade degree is greater than a certain value, manufacturer's upgrading of new products does not benefit a TPE in the secondary market except in industries where upgrades are typically minor or moderate (in which case, upgrading expands her survival space).
The manufacturer's product upgrade problem
455
Whether a manufacturer decides to release an upgraded new product in period 2 depends on whether doing so is more profitable than continuing to sell the original version product; that is, Π(p *
We thus compare total two-period profits in two cases: (1) the manufacturer releases an original version in the first period but an upgraded version in the second period 460 and (2) the manufacturer sells the original version in both periods. We draw the following conclusion:
Proposition 4. For the monopolistic manufacturer, there exists a threshold value for manufacturer's investment cost parameter
such that if K < K * (α), the manufacturer will release an upgraded version 465 product in period 2, but if K ≥ K * (α), he will keep selling the original version.
Proposition4 suggests that the manufacturer should use two different introduction strategies depending on the investment cost parameter of upgrading new products. When the investment cost parameter is small (K < K * (α)), the manufacturer should release an upgraded version in the second period because a 470 higher upgrade degree increases the competitiveness of second-period new products, a benefit that outweighs the potentially negative cannibalization effect of used products. When the investment cost parameter is large (K ≥ K * (α)),
A C C E P T E D M
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We then let δ = 0.9, c = 0.005 and numerically illustrate the change of threshold values of the manufacturers investment cost in upgrade degree(see Figure 4) . Figure 4 shows a marked decrease of the threshold value in the upgrade degree α. This observation implies that although the manufacturer may prefer to release an upgraded product in period 2, the decrease in the 480 threshold value of investment cost parameters limits his upgrade ability and makes upgrading extremely difficult when the upgrade degree is very large.
Hence, the manufacturer must find a balance between the upgrade degree and investment cost.
Having identified the optimal strategies for the manufacturer and TPE with 485 new product upgrade, we now gauge the extent to which upgrading impacts the profitability of both the manufacturer and TPE. The highly nonlinear equations
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A N U S C R I P T upgrade degree. This effect of the upgrade degree on the manufacturers total two-period profit is a result of two phenomena: On the one hand (effect E), the higher the new product upgrade degree in period 2, the higher the utilities of those consumers who buy a new product in period 1 then sell their used product and buy a new product in period 2, as well as of those who do not buy in the 510 first period but buy a new product in the second period. These choices result in a higher sales volume for the second-period new product, which increases the manufacturer's profit. On the other hand (effect F), as α increases, the utilities that the first-period consumers obtain from selling their used products to the TPE and buying a new one in the second period also increase, which 515 lowers the TPE's procurement cost for used products. In other words, the sales of used products in the second-period market increase. Nevertheless, because used products cannibalize new products in period 2, the competition from used products becomes stronger, which has a negative effect on the manufacturer's profits. Thus, when the value is low, effect E dominates effect F and the man-520 ufacturers profit increases in the upgrade degree, but when value is high, his profit decreases.
Again using the same parameters as in previous examples (δ = 0.9, c = 0.005, K = 0.005), we plot the changing of TPE's profits as the upgrade degree increases, which is depicted in Figure 6 . From Figure 6 , we have the following 525 observation.
Observation 2. The manufacturer's release of an upgraded product in the second period benefits a TPE in the secondary market, whose profit first increases and then decreases in the new product upgrade degree.
Here, Π e represents the TPE's profit when the manufacturer releases an up-530 graded product in period 2. As in the analysis of manufacturer profit, we find that the TPE's profit first increases (α ∈ (0, 0.331)) and then decreases (α ∈ [0.331, 0.769)) as the upgrade degree increases. This effect is also driven by two opposing forces. On the one hand (effect G), as α increases, the sales of ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T Figure 6 : TPE Profits used products in the second period increase, which leads to an increase in the 535 TPE's profit. On the other hand (effect H), a higher α makes second-period new products more competitive at the expense of used products, so the TPE's profit decreases in the upgrade degree. When effect G dominates effect H, the TPE's profit increases, otherwise, it decreases. Once again, the manufacturer's second-period upgrading of new products benefits the TPE when the upgrade 540 is minor (α ∈ (0, 0.331)) or moderate (α ∈ [0.331, 0.769)) but not when it is major (α ≥ 0.769)).
Conclusion
Although the durable product literature has long studied the effect of secondary markets on manufacturers strategies in the primary market, most re-545 search assumes either the secondary market is a perfect market or used products are sold outside the standard channel 10 . It thus ignores the effect of introducing upgraded new products on the TPE's entrance decision to secondary market.
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We, in contrast, examine how a manufacturers upgrade strategies in the durable goods market affect the TPE's entrance decision to secondary market. We con-550 sider several factors simultaneously in our model: an active secondary market, upgrading of new products, consumer market segmentation, and most especially, the upgrade degree of new products as a function of consumer demand.
To focus on the effect of introducing upgraded new products on the secondary market, we developed a dynamic two-period model in which a monopolistic 555 manufacturer sells his new durable products directly to end consumers in both periods, while in the second period, a TPE sells reverse channeled used products in a secondary market not directly controlled by the manufacturer. We derive the condition under which manufacturer's upgrading benefits a TPE. We also identify an investment cost threshold below which the manufacturer's optimal 560 strategy is to release an upgraded version product in the second period. We generate managerial insights into how manufacturer upgrading of new products impact the decision of the TPE in the secondary market by characterizing the optimal strategies of both parties. We find that manufacturer's upgrading of new products can increase a third-party entrant's profitability in a secondary 565 market when upgrades are typically small or moderate. It does not, however, benefit the TPE engaged in selling used products when upgrades are typically large.
The findings reported here suggest two obvious possibilities for further research. First, our model could be extended to a recovery market, a typical 570 assumption in the durable product literature, which would raise such additional issues as how different recovery channels of used products affect the strategies of the manufacturers product upgrade. Likewise, extending the model to an oligopoly market would raise new and interesting questions; especially, whether and how a firm should discriminate between its own former customers and those 575 of its rivals. 10.1287/mnsc.47.11.1515.10250. doi:10.1287/mnsc.47.11.1515.10250 .
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Appendices Appendix A. Equilibrium Decisions for the Channel Partners in Model
The TPE's optimization problem is
where all segment sizes have the functional form defined in the paper. Sub-700 stituting these segment sizes into the TPE's objective function, we find that
Therefore, the profit function of the TPE is concave in p u . The
Lagrangian for the TPE's problem is
and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for optimality are:
We consider two subcases according to whether the Lagrangean multiplier 705 λ 1 is greater than or equats to zero.
Case TPE-a: λ 1 = 0. Simultaneously solving for the above equations, we
. Therefore, the TPE will choose p *
.
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Case TPE-b: λ 1 > 0. Simultaneously solving for the above equations, we have
. In addition the Lagrangian
Meanwhile, from the utility function, we know that p 2 < 1 + α + c − δ. Therefore, we obtain
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We now consider the price of new products in the second period under the Case TPE-a. Note that we denote this case in Case M2-a. Replacing the values
2(1+α) and the constraint 0 < p 2 ≤ 2(1+α+c−δ) 3 of the Case TPE-a, we obtain the manufacturer's second period problem is
where all segment sizes have the functional form defined in the paper. Sub-720 stituting these segment sizes into the manufacturer's second-period problem, we find that
< 0. Therefore, the profit function of the manufacturer's second-period is concave in p 2 . The Lagrangian for the manufacturer's
We consider two subcases according to whether the Lagrange multiplier λ 2 is greater than or equals to zero.
Case M2-a-1: λ 2 = 0. Simultaneously solving for the above equations, we
. In addition, the constraint
of the manufacturer's second period problem leads to and the constraint of the case TPE-b, we obtain that the manufacturer's second period problem is
where all segment sizes have the functional form defined in the paper. Substituting these segment sizes into the manufacturer's second-period problem, . In addition, the constraint
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Now we consider the price of new products in the first period under the Case M2-a-1. Note that we denote this case as Case M1-a-1. Replacing the
and the constraint in Case M2-a-1, we obtain that the manufacturer's firs period problem is
where all segment sizes have the functional form defined in the paper. Substi-750 tuting these segment sizes into the manufacturer's first-period problem, we find that
< 0. Therefore, the profit function is concave in p 1 .
The Lagrangian for the manufacturer's first-period problem is
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for optimality are:
We consider two sub-cases according to whether the Lagrangian multiplier . It can be shown that p * 1 does not satisfy the constraint. Therefore, this case will never occur in equilibrium.
Similarly, we consider the price of new products in the first period Case M2-b. .
